Neoliberalism, as ItF narrates it, was neither a social movement (“politics from below”) nor, initially, a state project (“politics from above”), but a kind of conspiracy which aimed to capture both state power and social energies and turn them to its own ends. Its effective cunning, its ability to transform “contradictions” into “productive tensions”, was in part due to the fact that it had no identity to uphold: no fixed allegiance, no-one in whose name it was to speak. If neoliberalism was finally a class politics, it was a politics of the owners of capital qua owners of capital, whoever they might happen to be. We must understand Hayek’s “individual freedom” not only negatively, as freedom from state intervention or bonds of collective allegiance, but also positively, as freedom to act as a certain kind of abstract agent: a receiver and emitter of pricing signals. I alone must be able to say what the value of something is to me (deregulation), and I must have as many occasions as possible to deliver evaluations of this kind (marketisation).
The universal abstract subject (UAS) of neoliberalism is a transducer of price signals, a node in a massively distributed information system the global goal of which is to become more efficient. The role of producer is secondary: there must be inputs from labour in order for the system to have priceable things to regulate, but from the point of view of the system labour itself exists only as another priceable thing. As a counter to this, ItF proposes an alternative UAS, a self-and-other-actualising producer of values (to give it a slightly Nietzschean accent) whose “synthetic freedom” is the freedom to invent new things to do, and new means by which it can become more free to do them.
Politics in the name of a UAS, i.e. a vision of generic human capacity, is politics in a different register to politics in the name of justice, rights or equality. It is only interested in the ways people can be wounded, stigmatised, humiliated or excluded insofar as such injuries impinge on their ability to exercise the capacity by virtue of which they qualify as instances of the UAS. To many people this will seem weirdly amoral. Neoliberalism can be moralised, if we posit property rights as in some way fundamental to human dignity rather than simply as necessary preconditions for the exercise of liberal agency, but it has no real need of morality to motivate its defence of strong property rights: they are functionally indispensable, that’s all. ItF’s modernist UAS, liberated from work and empowered by technology to mould reality to its individual and collective wishes, has (increasingly) complex needs, but once again the reason why these needs should be met is not that suffering cries to the heavens for remedy, but that synthetic freedom requires us to be constantly levering ourselves further and further away from the precarity and waste of subsistence-level survival. (An open, and troubling, question for ItF’s whole project is how this “ourselves” can be properly inclusive of all humanity, and not merely codify the entitlement of its wealthiest part to all the resources they can lay their hands on).
In some quarters, access to the internet is now being discussed as a universal human right. From the point of view of ItF’s UAS this is exactly as it should be, because internet access is functionally necessary for certain kinds of projects which a subset of humanity is now able to undertake (creating open source software, for example, or arguing about books on blogs). But this is then a conception of “rights” which is contingent on the ongoing elaboration of human powers and freedoms, rather than grounded in human nature or motivated by a ceaseless ethical vigilance over human vulnerability.
What ItF wants to have in common with neoliberalism, then – besides its demonstrated effectiveness as a hegemonic strategy – is a certain detachment from morality, a sense that moral concerns are politically secondary. (This sense is also present in some, but by no means all, formulations of revolutionary politics). There is a deliberate break here with what we might call pastoral politics, politics which proposes an ideal moral order and looks for ways that this order can be established so that we can all live peacefully within it. Modernist Prometheanism is decidedly anti-pastoral, because its demand for openness about possible human goals and purposes is incompatible with any scheme in which everyone has and knows their place in a global moral order. Its strongest critique of neoliberalism, then, is not that the latter is amoral and destructive, but that it, too, constitutes a premature and drastically limiting decision in favour of a singular vision of human purpose.