There was a moment during my reading of Peter Wolfendale’s OOP: TNNC where I demurred somewhat, and it was at his reading of Harman on time/space.
Harman claims that real change is spatial, not temporal; in this he seems to me to be in agreement with Badiou, amongst others. Time for Harman, as for Badiou, is the temporality of permutation, during which an object’s properties cycle through various actualisations; real change is change to the disposition of the elements over which the temporal “cursor” ranges, and is experienced as temporal discontinuity, a break between epochs. (cf Foucault and the episteme, etc). Pete complains that this doesn’t enable us to account for the “deep” cosmological time of the arche-fossil, since all we have is local temporalities, cursors over objects – cosmological time must encompass the history of all possible objects, and cannot be local in that sense. On the other hand, the notion of a global temporality is tricksy to say the least, for good scientific (relativistic) reasons. In space-time, the everything that happens is intertwined with the temporality of its happening – when we say “such-and-such happened twenty billion years ago”, we typically omit a number of qualifications that it would be troublesome to spell out in detail.
This afternoon I read, in Chatelet:
“Time is born along with the Heavens, Plato assures us in the Timaeus, and was created on the model of eternal nature. It is the image of that eternal progression whose rhythm is number. The perfect year, the conjunction of the revolutions of the eight planets, has elapsed precisely once the Same has completed its revolution. Closed up in the gilded cage of Eternity, Time is certainly not responsible for the flux of becoming. So what is it that permits change? It is Space, the condition of dispersion, and thus also the condition of the meaningless scandals and provocations of the Other.”
So, I think it’s safe to say that this isn’t a deviant position, philosophically speaking. It’s arguably a very orthodox position within continental thought – you can see an echo of it in Bergson’s distinction between temps and durée, for example. It therefore seems a bit unfair to pick on Harman for playing his own variation on this theme – it’s reasonable within his system for him to localise temporality to objects, since objects are the foci of what-there-is. If we want to say that the temporality of scientific cosmology is different (non-cyclic, for one thing), we should certainly be able to say so, but the problem here is a problem for all philosophy within this tradition of thinking about temporality, not just Harman’s.